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CIVIL CODE:
NOTES FOR AN UNCELEBRATED CENTENNIAL
WILLIAM B. FISCH*
This is the first installment of a projected study of the
Dakota Civil Code. While this portion deals with the historical
background of the Code and its content as drafted for New
York by David Dudley Field, a subsequent article will deal
with its fate in the hands of the bar, the legislature and the
courts in New York, California, and especially rthe Dakotas.
On January 12, 1866, Dakota Territory, m its fifth year of
territorial existence and still consisting of a few scattered settle-
ments on the fringes of a vast Indian-swept, fort-flecked wilderness,
adopted that hallmark of advanced civilization, a Civil Code.1 This
particular monument of legislation, codifying the substantive private
law, was imported almost verbatim from New York, the product of
a Code Commission whose chairman and chief draftsman 2 was
David Dudley Field. The final report of this Commission was sub-
mitted to the New York legislature on February 13, 1865; some
time m the next few months a printed copy of the final report came
into the hands of the Supreme Court of Dakota Territory, who were
" favorably impressed",3 and with very minor editing the code
was adopted by the Territorial legislature which convened in
December, 1865. Dakota was thus the first jurisdiction to adopt the
so-called New York Code;4 California adopted a substantially
amended version m 1872; 5 Idaho, following California's lead and
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. A.B. 1957, Harvard Col-
lege, L..L B. 1960, University of Illinois. M. Comp. L. 1962, University of Chicago.
1. LAws oF DAKoTA TERarroRY, §§ 1-2034 (1865).
2. Field was primarily responsible for the Civil Code, other members of the Commission
for the Penal Code, Probate Code, Political Code and Code of Criminal Procedure. Reppy,
"The Field Codification Concept," in FIrLo CENTENARY EssAYs, 50 (1949).
3. 1 KiNGSBURY, DAKOTA TERRrToRY 430 (1915).
4. This designation is used to distinguish the Civil Code from the more famous Code
of Civil Procedure, which is most frequently referred to as "the Field Code."
5. C.. CIv. CODE (1872), effective January 1, 1873.
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experience, adopted a further amended version in 1887; 6 Montana
a still further amended version in 1895;7 while New York, despite
great debate and at least five journeys through the legislative
process in the 1870's and 1880's, ultimately abandoned the project.
January 12, 1966, passed, so far as I am aware, without so
much as a mention of the New York Code as such or of Dakota's role
in putting it into effect. Indeed, of the five American jurisdictions
which adopted the code in one form or another, only California
retains it (greatly but haphazardly amended) as a separate body
of law, although at least m North Dakota the better portion of the
original provisions remains in pieces scattered throughout the con-
solidated Century Code. By almost any standard of comparison, and
certainly in comparison with Field's own earlier Code of Civil
Procedure, which was adopted in New York in 1848 and subsequently
in about thirty other states,8 and which is only recently being
replaced by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the dominant
system in the United States,9 the Civil Code must be termed if
not a failure, certainly less than completely successful. Why is it
now all but forgotten? What purposes did it seek to achieve? Would
it have been more successful in operation if the adopting states
had handled it differently' These questions may not be answerable
to anyone's complete satisfaction; but the following will attempt
a review of some of the evidence.
It must be noted here, though it ought to be superfluous to do
so, that the subject is not exclusively a matter of historical curiosity
The goal of capturing the substance of the law in the form of
comprehensive and systematic legislation is one actively pursued
in this country today, and not merely by idle academics. The
activities of the American Law Institute and of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws need only be mentioned:
The Restatements of the Law are now coming out in revised second
editions, and the Commissioners' greatest work, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, is now the law of three-fourths of the states and
almost certainly will become the uniform law of the land. A glance
at the thousand-odd volumes of the sparest working private prac-
titioner's library-let alone the 50,000 volumes of the most minimal
research library and the several million of the most complete existing
collections-affords such a convincing impression of the need for
rationalization of the sources of the law that one can scarcely believe
6. IDAHO REv. STAT. § 2400 (1887).
7. CODEs OF MONT., Part II, 768 (1895).
8. Clark, Code Plead4ng and Practice Today, cited in Reppy, spra, note 2, at 55.
9. The Federal Rules have been adopted in substance by at least 20 states, including
North Dakota (1957), see WwonT, FEDvmAL COURTS 225 (1963). The Field Code, of course,
is not merely predecessor to the Rules but progenitor; Ibid.
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that this complaint has been voiced without much success by lawyers
and laymen for centuries. No less a champion of the Common Law
than Roscoe Pound, in his last great work, concluded that the time
for codification of Anglo-American law may have come. 10 If the
goal is to be pursued in the private law, it will be important to
understand the strengths and weaknesses of the New York code,
as one of the few precedents in the common law world. It may
also be possible, incidentally, to gain some understanding of the
present law of North Dakota.
THE 19TH CENTURY CODIFICATION MOVEMENT
A sketch of the background of legal ideas into which Field's
work was cast is in order here. For that purpose, although the
roots of the idea of codification go back as far as our knowledge
about law goes, we may begin with the publication in the 1760's of
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England and in the next
decades of Jeremy Bentham's Fragment on Government (1776) and
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) Blackstone's work was
the outcome of the introduction for the first time of a systematic
study of English law in the universities; until he assumed the newly-
created Vinerian professorship at Oxford, university law (if any)
was Roman law, and the working common law was the more or
less exclusive property of the bar, cultivated through the Inns of
Court and the articling system." The popularity of the Commen-
tares in the United States was immediate and overwhelming, and
it served through countless editions for much of the 19th century
as the lawyer's primer, supplemented in detail for American needs
by Kent's Commentaries and Story's treatises. 1 2 With Bentham's
work, on the other hand, begins the so-called legislative reform
movement in England and the United States, of which the codifi-
cation movement was a corollary The Fragment on Government,
in which Bentham first sets forth his reformist philosophy, is a
"Comment on the Commentaries,"1 3 a broad attack on Blackstone's
conception of law as reflected in certain passages in his introduction.
The prime contribution made by Blackstone to the codification
controversy of the nineteenth century was the apotheosis of the
unwritten or customary law, the lex non scripta, as "the first ground
10. 3 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE, 732-38 (1959). Compare the smug jingoism of his early
article, The Place of Judge Story sn the Making of American Law, 48 AMER. LAW REV.
676 (1915).
11. 12 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 91-10-1 (1938). Blackstone began his lec-
tures in 1753, and the chair was created for him in 1758.
12. See HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMEICAN LAW" THE LAW MAKERS, 257 (1950).
13. The phrase is Bentham's own. BENTHAM, FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 98 (Montague
ed. 1891).
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and chief cornerstone of the laws of England."" While there had
been attempts by early English kings to compile authoritative digests
of the customary law,15 which digests may have been the direct
source for the statements of later treatise writers, still the authority
of the common law derived not from sovereign command but from
immemorial custom. 16 The function of determining what the cus-
tomary law is on any given point, or of testing the validity of any
statement of it, is performed by the courts; and the courts will
take as the primary evidence of the existence of a customary rule
prior judicial decisions to that effect. 7 Therefore the established
rule was that precedents must be followed. However, Blackstone
admitted of a higher authority than precedent, namely reason or
Divine Law, or what is also called Natural Law If a precedent is
absurd or unjust, it would not be followed. Nonetheless, Blackstone
was careful to point out, when a precedent is rejected, it is not
rejected because it is bad law, but because it is not law, that is, that
it is an inaccurate statement of the customary law "I Thus the
judge does not make law here, although he may be the sole govern-
mental organ with the power to determine its content; the law is
given to him by custom, and "reason" and "Divine law" are not
so much sources of law as tests of the accuracy of a given statement
of the law, and generally the model to which the law strives to
conform.19 For it is not enough that the real reasons behind a given
precedent be obscure, to allow a judge to replace it with what he
14. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *73.
15. He refers in 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES $64-65 to "Alfred's dome-book" and sub-
sequent revisions by Edgar and Edward the Confessor.
16. " [T]he maxims and customs are of higher antiquity than memory or
history can reach, nothing being more difficult than to ascertain the precise beginning and
first spring of an ancient and long-established custom. Whence it is that in our law the
goodness of a custom depends upon its having been used time out of mind, or, in the
solemnity of our legal phrase, time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the con-
trary." 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67.
17. "They are the depositaries of the laws; the living oracles, who must decide in all
cases of doubt, and who are 'bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land.
The knowledge of that law is derived from experience and study; and from being
long personally accustomed to the judicial decisions of their predecessors. And indeed these
judicial decisions are the principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of
the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law." 1 BLACKSTONE,
CoMMENTAR S 69.
18. "But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law,
but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former de-
cision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law,
but that it was not law, that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has
been erroneously determined." 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69-70.
19. Thus a statute, whose accuracy as a statement of the law (the will of Parliament)
is not open to question, cannot be rejected by the courts as contrary to reason, Parliament
is superior to the Judiciary as a source of law. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "91. Bentham
misses this point (as he does many others), when he attacks the notion that the courts
can be given power to declare an act of Parliament void, thinking he finds it in the some-
what loose statement that "no human laws should be suffered to contradict" Divine or
natural law, 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 42. See BENTHAM, op. Oi. supra note 13, at 213.
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understands to be a more rational solution, rather he must find
that the rule is flatly contrary to reason.
20
Blackstone's theme, then, was reverence for all things English,
and most especially for the judicially-developed common law Per-
haps this attitude was made inevitable by his mission of establishing
the common law as a university study in direct competition with
the hallowed Roman law Today we may be inclined to read into
his smug (or defensive) but eloquent assessment of the English
legal system the seeds of the liberalizing role of the judiciary which
characterized the English chancery of a much earlier day, and
which has periodically characterized the constitutional interpreta-
tions of the United States Supreme Court, as well as much of the
work of the regular American courts in the 19th century 21 But m
the England of his day Blackstone's praise and rationalization of
the status quo was sufficiently at variance with the actual perform-
ance of the system to jolt the sensibilities of many, especially those
of Jeremy Bentham. It has been pointed out that the spirit of the
English leadership in the last quarter of the 18th century was not
at all callous and inhuman, rather philanthropic and conciliatory to-
ward interests such as the Catholic Church which had been previously
the victims of severe repression. 22 The judiciary had managed,
through Lord Mansfield, to incorporate much of the law merchant
into the common law However, the law was still ostensibly domi-
nated by incredibly severe criminal sanctions, repressive regulation
of labor, a long-outdated system of land tenures which inhibited
the commercial and industrial use of land, and a commercial law
which, despite the assistance of the internationally accepted law
merchant, was in many ways unhelpful if not hostile toward com-
merce, particularly in the law of bankruptcy and of corporations.
2
Such reform as took place was accomplished through the use of
judicial fictions and evasions, reaching acceptable results in particu-
lar cases while leaving the outdated theories and statutes available
for rigid application by less enlightened or less imaginative judges.2 4
It was the need for reform of the substantive law-primarily of
the criminal law-that motivated Bentham, and he reached the
20. "Not that the particular reason of every rule In the law can at this distance of time
be always precisely assigned, but it is sufficient that there be nothing In the rule flatly
contradictory to reason, and then the law will presume it to be well founded. And it hath
been an ancient observation in the laws of England, that whenever a standing rule of law,
of which the reason perhaps could not be remembered or discerned, hath been wantonly
broken In upon by statutes or new resolutions, the wisdom of the rule hath in the end ap-
peared from the Inconveniences that have followed the innovation." 1 BLACKsTONE, Com-
MENITARi8E *70.
21. As to the latter, see Hurst, op. cit. supra note 12, at 184-9.
22. DICEY, LAW AND OPINION IN ElNGLAND DURING THE 19TH CENTURY 77-83 (2d ed.
1914).
23. See also STONn, HUmAN LAW AND HUMAN JUSTICE 118-17 (1965).
24. See Dicsy, op. cit. 8upr, note 22 at 165-67.
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conclusion that the legislature was the only agency capable of full
scale law reform. Blackstone's overoptimistic evaluation of the
capacity of customary law, supplemented by "reason" and admm-
istered by the courts, to fulfill the need for reform made him in
Bentham's eyes a mortal enemy A passage in the preface to the
Fragment on Government sets the tone, and indicates why Bentham
and his writings tended to polarize opinion and to prevent rational
discussion.
If to [law reform] we should fancy any Author, especially
any Author of great name, to be, and as far as could in
such case be expected, to avow himself a determined and
persevering enemy, what should we say of him? We should
say that the interests of reformation, and through them the
welfare of mankind, were inseparably connected with the
downfall of his works; of a great part, at least, of the esteem
and influence, which these works might under whatever title
have acquired.
Such an enemy it has been my misfortune (and not mine
only) to see, or fancy at least that I saw, in the Author
of the celebrated Commentaries on the Laws of England;
It is on this account that I conceived, some time since, the
design of pointing out some of what appeared to me the
capital blemishes of that work, particularly this grand and
fundamental one, the antipathy to reformation; or rather,
indeed, of laying open and exposing the universal inaccuracy
and confusion which seemed to my apprehension to pervade
the whole. For, indeed, such an ungenerous antipathy seemed
of itself enough to promise a general vein of obscure and
crooked reasoning, from whence no clear and sterling knowl-
edge could be derived; so intimate is the connection between
some of the gifts of the understanding, and some of the
affections of the heart.
25
It is clear that the conception of the judge as a minister rather
than a creator of law, as voiced by Blackstone, was not what
Bentham objected to. He regarded the judiciary as just so many
more "executive magistrates, ' 26 and not an independent branch of
government. So, too, Blackstone's coordinate branches were not the
American executive, legislative and judicial, but rather one execu-
tive (Crown) and two legislative (Lords and Commons), although
the House of Lords was the highest court of appeal and traditionally
the original source of jurisdiction for all courts, 27 Lords was none-
25. BENTHAM, Op. cit. Supra note 13, at 94-5.
26. The phrase is used in BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS ANv LEoISLATION 65 (1879).
27. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *56-7. The real significance of this tradition, tracing
back to Magna Charta, appears to have been slight in BIackstone's time, except as an his-
torical explanation for the judicial function of Lords.
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theless primarily a legislative body Neither Blackstone nor Bentham
accorded the courts power to annul acts of the legislature on higher-
law grounds, though Bentham thought Blackstone did.28 Bentham
explains his position on the ground that while Parliament may not
be the perfect representative body, it is one in which "the people"
have at least some influence, whereas the judges are appointed
by the very executive against whose oppression protection is
sought.2 9 Indeed, Bentham allows himself a measure of praise in
this respect for the English judicial tradition:
One of the most eminent characteristics of the English tri-
bunal is their scrupulous fidelity in following the declared
will of the legislator; and in directing themselves as much
as possible, by former judgments, in that imperfect part of
English legislation which depends on custom. This rigid ob-
servation of the laws may have considerable inconveniences
in an incomplete system, but it is the true spirit of liberty
which inspires the English with much horror for what they
call ex post facto laws.30
Bentham's objection to Blackstone's paean to the status quo,
in so far as the judiciary is concerned, was rather simply that the
judiciary was an inadequate institution for the ascertainment of the
law and the adaptation of it to meet the needs of the day, especially
so in view of the very virtues of obedience and conservatism de-
manded of it. The law had to be divined out of the maze of particular
lawsuits, the records of which until 1730 were in law-latin, which no
one but a lawyer and by no means all of them could understand;3 '
even after proceedings were required to be in English, "fiction,
tautology, technicality, circuity, irregularity, inconsistency re-
main. ' 32 Instead, Bentham developed criteria for sound legislation
which he felt "judge-made" law could not possibly fulfill.
For Blackstone's natural or Divine law, which he dismissed as
a polite word for personal predilection, he substituted the "principle
of utility "33 In this principle he found the guiding ideas not only
of criminal law reform, which was his chief concern, but also of
the private or civil law These ideas were set forth most clearly in
the Theory of Legislation, first published in French in 1802, con-
taining a chapter entitled "Principles of the Civil Code"-intended
no doubt for the benefit of the commission working on Napoleon's
civil code project, or for the proponents of such a commission. The
28. See, supra note 19.
29. BENTHAM, op. cit. supra note 13, at 221.
30. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION, 156 (1911).
31. BENTHAM, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 113.
32. Ib d.
33. BENTHAM, Op. cit. supra note 30, 1-4.
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principle of utility was seen as yielding four basic purposes of
legislation: Subsistence, Abundance, Equality, and Security4 Of
these, Security is the most important (liberty being but a branch of
security), and this consists, at least as a goal for legislation in the
private law, in the maintenance of the expectations of the people. s 5
He then listed seven conditions necessary to the attainment of this
most important goal of legislation. Two are substantive, that the law
must be in conformity with expectations, and that it must be in
conformity with the principle of utility The possible inconsistency
between these two notions is crucial to the whole codification move-
ment and to Bentham's place in it; but he dismissed the problem
by noting that as soon as the utility of a law becomes apparent to
the public, any contrary expectations will be willingly abandoned.36
The remainder are formal in nature: that the laws should be known,
logically or conceptually consistent, methodical or systematic,
certain to be executed, and literally followed. Further, or perhaps
therefore, the law must be written, and in a style which emphasizes
simplicity and common language. The ideal is stated with quotable
eloquence:
If that obscure system called custom were no longer per-
mitted, and everything were reduced to written law, if the
laws which concern every member of the community were
arranged in one volume, and those which concern particular
classes m little separate collections; if the general code were
universally disseminated; had it become, as among the He-
brews, a part of worship and a manual of education; if a
knowledge of it were required as preliminary to the enjoy-
ment of political rights;-the law would then be truly known;
every deviation from it would be manifest; every citizen
would become its guardian; its violation would not be a
mystery; its explanation would not be a monopoly; and fraud
and chicane would no longer be able to elude it.
If the style of the code differed from that of other
books, it should be by a greater clearness, by a greater
precision, by a greater familiarity; because it is designed for
all understandings, and particularly for the least enlightened
class. 87
These ideas, or variants of some or all of them, can be said to lie
behind every subsequent effort toward codification in Anglo-
American law, and certainly behind the efforts of David Dudley
Field.
34. Id. at 96.
35. Id. at 110-11.
36. Id. at 151-2.
37. Id. at 156-7.
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Bentham's most sympathetic audience was in post-revolutionary
France, where his works were published (many for the first time)
in substantially edited and revised form by Etienne Dumont, begin-
ning with the Theory of Legislation in 1802. Some credit is given
to these works for the ultimate acceptance of the idea of codifying
the civil law by Napoleon and by the conservative scholars com-
missioned by him to do the work, after several drafts of codes
failed during the revolution proper; the phrasing of the utilitarian
theory in sufficiently mild terms to win acceptance has been attri-
buted largely to Dumont. 8  His dominance over the English legal
scene did not come until the end of his life, when the Reform Act
was passed by Parliament in 1832, the year of Bentham's death-
and, incidentally, the year of publication of John Austin's lectures
on Jurisprudence, which were strongly influenced by (but also
critical of some aspects of) "Benthamism."' 9
The influence of Benthamism on the legislative reform move-
ment in the United States dates from about the same period. In
1811 Bentham addressed to President Madison an offer to codify
the laws of the United States, and at Madison's suggestion made
similar offers to some of the states who then as now had competence
over the general law, but none of these offers were accepted.40
In at least one of these offers Bentham suggested that the chief
benefit to be gained by a code is to make every man is own
lawyer; 4 1 while there was probably a substantial reception for such
an idea among laymen, it can be doubted that there was much
among lawyers, or among legislators who were themselves mostly
lawyers.4 2 Nonetheless, a substantial work of legislative reform was
accomplished in New York with the promulgation of the Revised
Statutes of 1828, which not only brought the bulk of the statutory
law of the state into organzed form but also effected substantial
modernizations of the substantive law, chiefly in the law of real
property Field incorporated most of this legislation into his code.
This can be said to be the first important fruit of the legislative
reform movement m the common law world. In 1825, on the other
hand, in that corner of the United States governed primarily by the
civil law, Edward Livingston completed his revision of the Louisiana
38. BENTHAM, op. Cit. supra note 13, at 10-11. In introduction by Montague.
39. Dicey dates the period of intellectural dominance of Bentharnism from 1825. DICEy,
op. cit. supra note 22, at 126.
40. Passage quoted and note appended in HONNOLD, THE L= OF THE LAw 100-02
(1964).
41. Passage quoted from an 1817 pamphlet, Lewinsohn, Low Reform sn Californza, 3
CALIF. L. REV. 300, 303 (1915).
42. Perry Miller points out that the more successful advocates of codification within the
legal profession in the 1820's, particularly Grimke in South Carolina, dropped the every-
man-his-own-lawyer notion and emphasized rationalization and systematization and "sci-
ence",'of which more below. Mrjai, THE LIE OF Tm MUND iN AmEICA 245-48 (1965).
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Civil Code, modeled strongly on the Napoleonic code but with sub-
stantial changes (mostly by way of expansion) This was also used
frequently by Field as a source.
The first serious motion made toward true codification in the
common law states came in Massachusetts with the establishment
in 1836 of a commission headed by Joseph Story to investigate the
feasibility and desirability of codifying the common law of Massa-
chusetts.4 3 While no direct action was taken on the basis of their
report, submitted in 1837, Story's subsequent importance in the
rationalization of American law through his many treatises and the
sober, practical logic of the report make it a significant milestone.
In the report, a distinction was sharply made between a codification
in Bentham's sense, namely a complete rendition in every detail of
the entire body of the law into systematic statutory form, and codifi-
cation in a more limited sense, namely a coherent, logical statement
of the general principles of the law, along with such detailed
exceptions, qualification, etc., as "have already, by judicial decisions
or otherwise, been engrafted upon" such principles, "and are now
capable of distinct enunciation." 44 The first alternative was rejected
as impracticable; the second was recognized as feasible, and the
French civil code was given as a living example, both of the feasi-
bility of the approach and of the great amount of construction, argu-
ment, development and elaboration which necessarily supplements
such a code. In effect, therefore, Story rejected the Benthamite
dichotomy between statute-law and judge-made-law, and took the
French experience as proof that the latter cannot be eliminated by
codification.
More important still for our understanding of the debate which
raged over Field's civil code in New York and elsewhere in the
1870's and 1880's, however, is Story's insistence that a code can
only contain that portion of the common law which is known, well-
ascertained, and well-defined. Thus he explained why the general
principles of the common law, as distinguished from the applications
of those principles to particular instances, were capable of being
reduced to a code:
These general principles are to be found, for the most part,
collected in elementary treatises now extant, upon the whole
or particular branches of the common law They are capable
43. Set aside here are at least two very early considerations of codification pursuant to
rationalist principles: by the Virginia legislature in 1776, whose commission led by Jeffer-
son abandoned the attempt except to call (unsuccessfully) for a codification of statutes,
and by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1791, whose commission headed by James Wilson
was eventually denied even initial appropriation. See MiLLER, op. oft. supra note 42, at
239-41.
44. The report is published as Codification of the Common Low, THE MISCELLANEOUS
WRITrNGs OF.JOSEPH STORY 698-735 (W Story ed. 1852).
494
DAKOTA CIVIL CODE
of being stated m the very form and language, in which they
are there enunciated, as they have, from long examinations
and critical trials, acquired a precision and exactness, which
approach very near to scientific accuracy; and for all the
ordinary uses of life, they are sufficiently clear m their
interpretations and qualifications.
45
Clearly for Story codification was not a creative process so much as
a descriptive one; it was not a means of achieving certainty, clarity,
and definition, but rather presupposed that these goals already have
been achieved. It must therefore be accurate, and can only en-
compass that which can be accurately described.
Story did not fully develop this notion. His emphasis on the
descriptive nature of the task may result as much from the fact
that description was all he was asked to consider-the report is
entitled not "Codification of Law" but "Codification of the Common
Law of Massachusetts"-as from a conviction that a code could
properly do nothing else. Nonetheless we can see in his report the
influence of ideas which were most fully developed in the course
of the century by the so-called "historical school" of German
jurists, and which in turn gained currency in the United States in
the latter third of the century The historical school was founded
by C. F von Savigny with his book On the Vocation of Our Age for
Legislation and Jurisprudence, published in 1814 as a response to
a proposal to enact a civil code for Germany based upon Napoleon's
for France. The thrust of his argument was that private law is not
deliberately laid down by a sovereign but grows more or less
spontaneously out of the life -of a people, and that before a useful
codification of its laws can be accomplished it is necessary to know
the people, its history and conditions of life, and to develop the
systematic study of the living law to a high degree. Germany could
not satisfy any of these conditions at that time, therefore any codifi-
cation for Germany would have been disastrously premature. It has
been suggested that Savigny's real concern was not so much that a
people not be governed by a premature codification, as that Germany
not be governed by a French code. 46 Be that as it may, Savigny pro-
ceeded to establish in the German universities a generation of
scholars devoted to investigation, analysis and systematization of
the law applied in Germany, which lasted through the entire 19th
century and which culminated m the Civil Code of 1900. 47 It was
45. Id. at 713-14.
46. KOSCHAKER, EUROPA UND DAS ROmISCHE RECHT [EUROPE AND THE ROMAN LAW]
258-59 (1947). (Munich, C. H. Beck, 1947, repr. 1953).
47. Ironically, though perhaps inevitably, the historical school had by that time develop-
ed its ostensibly inductive analysis to such a high degree thatL it had spawned its own
scholasticism, and the German Civil Code was clearly an attempt to render in legislative
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Savigny who popularized the notion that law was a "science" in
the modern sense, that is, not scholastic but empirical, not deduc-
tive but inductive; and this notion more than any other was the
weapon that ultimately defeated Field's code in New York.
48 It
seems likely that Story was already familiar with these ideas in
1837, since he had published in 1832 the first of his great treatises,
on Bailments, which shows a thorough familiarity with the civil
law and the French code, though it does not cite Savigny as an
authority on the civil law His references to French and Roman
sources were so numerous in fact that he felt moved in the preface
to explain, if not to apologize for, so much use of foreign law 49
The chief advantages which Story saw as flowing from a
codification of the common law were: (1) a simplification of the
job of researching the law, by eliminating to a large extent the
necessity for a lawyer, in order not to miss any possible relevant
authority, to slog through numberless cases in all their factual
detail; 0 (2) the rendering of the more general and useful rules
of law accessible to the layman, as a "means of guarding them
from gross mistakes in business, or gross violations of the rights
of others", 51 and (3) a reduction in the number of lawsuits resulting
from the inability of the less studious or well-outfitted lawyer to
determine precisely what is the law applicable to is client's situ-
ation. Neither lawyers nor judges can be eliminated, but the law
can be made more accessible and clear
In the same year in which Story's report to the Massachusetts
legislature was published, David Dudley Field set up his own prac-
tice and joined in agitation for reform of the law of New York.
52
His first target was procedure: the division between law and equity,
survivals of the archaic forms of action, and a general overtechm-
cality in procedural rules. Here codification was not so much an
end in itself as the indispensible vehicle for a thorough-going, radical
form a self-contained, highly logical system of precisely formulated, interlocking general
concepts, the combination of which would answer as nearly as possible to all the legal needs
of the people in the private sector. Indeed the whole historical movement, in its reliance
on Roman law as the framework for research and analysis, and in its academic emphasis,
has been aptly characterized as "professors' law", as distinguished from the "lawyers' law"
of classical Rome, England, and to a lesser degree pre-revolutionary France. KOSCHAKER,
op. cit., at 211.
48. Interestingly enough, Austin insisted that Bentham was of the historical or induc-
tive school, and that it was only a peculiarity of Sarvigny's thought that he should have
been an enemy of codification while other historians such as Thibault were pro-codification.
2 LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 679 (Campbell ed. 1885). This seems to exaggerate Ben-
tham's interest in empirical study of a given country's law-in-action as well as Savigny's
real opposition to codification.
49. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW or BAILMENTS at xi-xii (3rd ed. 1843). It is a
little ironic that precisely in this area Field's code relies on Story most heavily.
50. STORY, OP. cit. supra note 44, at 723.
51. Id. at 722.
52. Reppy, The Field Codification Concept in FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 80-1.
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reform of the procedural law; in this connection Field can be
regarded as a Benthamite m the fullest sense. However, the need
for radical reform was widely enough felt among the public as
well as the bar, that the 1846 state constitutional convention included
in the constitution a provision for the establishment of a commission
"to revise, reform, simplify and abridge the rules and practice,
pleadings, forms and proceedings of the courts." Though initially
rejected as too radical, Field managed shortly to get on the com-
mission, and the Code of Civil Procedure which was the result of
their labors was adopted in 1848. 53
The same constitution of 1846 also contained a provision calling
for the establishment of a commission to codify the substantive
law Here, however, reform was not the keynote of the provision;
the language is strongly reminiscent of Story
[The legislature] shall appoint three commissioners, whose
duty it shall be to reduce into a written code the whole
body of the law of this state, or so much and such parts
thereof as to the said commissioners shall seem practicable
and expedient. And the said commissioners shall specify such
alterations and amendments therein as they shall deem
proper 11
Field himself read this as calling for codification of the Common
Law He chastised the members of the original commission, which
after four years had accomplished nothing and whose authorizing
legislation was repealed in 1850, for their lack of faith in codification
of the common law and for limiting their ambition to a revision of
the statutes.5 5 After constant agitation by Field, the Code Com-
mission was revived in 1857 by the legislature, with Field as
chairman.
Field's conception of the task of codification of the substantive
law-at least in the private law, for which he was primarily re-
sponsible-is a somewhat different one from that of reforming
procedural law In the latter, the rules themselves needed changing;
in the former, what was most unsatisfactory was the confusing form
in which the rules were to be found, the lack of a clear statement
of some rules anywhere, the persistence of technical distinctions
such as law/equity that had lost their substance, and the inacces-
sibility of the law to the general public. Nonetheless, the first report
of the commission, submitted in 1858 to outline the projected work
embracing a political, a civil and a penal code, shows Field drawing
a broad power to revise the law if not to reform it:
53. Ibid.
54. N.Y, CONST. art. I, § 17 (1846).
55. 1 THE SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS STATEMENTS OP DAVID DUDLEY
FIELD 307 (Sprague ed. 1884).
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Two great purposes are to be subserved in revising the
jurisprudence of a nation: the reduction of existing laws
into a more accessible form, resolving doubts, removing
vexed questions, and abolishing useless distinctions; the
other, the introduction of such modifications as are plainly
indicated by our own judgment or the experience of others.
We are satisfied that this work should be performed with
delicacy, caution and discrimination, that nothing should be
touched from mere desire of change, or without great prob-
ability of solid advantage. That which in the judgment
of the Commissioners can reasonably be attempted is
to collect, condense and arrange those general and com-
prehensive rules of action, resting upon fundamental prin-
ciples, recognized by the law or by reason, which will afford,
as far as possible, a guide in regard to the rights of person
and of property 56
In the introduction to the completed code, submitted with the Ninth
and Final Report of the Commission on February 13, 1865, Field
enumerates the advantages to be obtained through codification:
(1) saving of shelf space for law libraries; (2) saving of vast labor
in legal research; (3) settling of disputed questions which the
courts have not been able to resolve; (4) reform of the law, where
necessary; (5) diffusion of more general and accurate knowledge
of the law among the public. 57 The extent of his ambition is indicated
in the following remarks in connection with the fourth advantage:
The making of a Code involves a general revision of the
law It is indeed in this way alone that such a revision
seems practicable. The occasion is thereby afforded to look
at the law of the land, as a whole, to lop off its excrescences,
reconcile its contradictions, and make it uniform and har-
monious. 58
It is clear, then, that Field, while calmer, more judicious, and
much more a lawyer than Bentham, still had a great deal more
of the reformer in him than Story Perhaps this is why Field managed
to complete a code, while Story got only so far as a series of private
treatises. Nonetheless, due to factors of time and place and no doubt
of personality, as well as the form in which their offerings were
cast, Story's treatises can be said to have had much greater influence
on the private substantive law than did the New York Code. Indeed,
the Code itself took a great deal of advantage of Story's treatises
as sources for specific provisions and general classifications. The
advantage of a treatise, of course, is that it can be useful and in-
56. Id. at 312.
57. N.Y. Civ. CODE at xxix-Xxx (1865).
58. Id. at xix.
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fluential merely by gathering together the available sources on a
given point, noting similarities and differences in approach and
result, and suggesting a preference, without firmly committing either
the writer or the reader to one answer The legislator, on the other
hand, cannot discuss, suggest or speculate, but must decide, ignore,
or leave vague; and one who proposes legislation reforms at the
risk of rejection.
With this background of ideas, purposes and problems, we can
turn to some of the outstanding features of the New York Code,
and perhaps get an inkling of the difficulty it faced in gaming
acceptance.
THE CODE AND THE COURTS
As we have seen, the chief talking point of codification is the
superiority of legislation over judicial decisions as the primary
source of law The first key to understanding any given code, then,
is the role it foresees for the courts in applying it. It appears to
have been a great temptation for codifiers to try to restrict the
role of courts as much as possible. Justinian, for example, decreed
that the Emperor was the sole interpreter of statutes, as well as
the sole author; 59 apparently at one point in the post-revolutionary
discussion of codification in France, Robespierre also advocated a
general prohibition against interpretation;6 0 and we have noted that
Bentham set down as essential to the achievement of security in
expectations, that the laws be literally followed. 61 We may regard
these attempts as doomed from the start; Justinian's prohibition
was not taken seriously, 62 Robespierre's was repudiated by the
Napoleonic code, and Bentham's was never incorporated into any
actual system. The difficulty, of course, is that such a prohibition
against interpretation, if taken literally, leaves the judge without
a guide in situations not clearly covered by the code, and creates
the risk that such cases will not be decided at all. Thus the Napoleonic
code in article 4 makes it a crime to refuse to decide a case on the
pretext that the law is silent, obscure, or insufficent on the point
to be decided.6 3
The problem of the unprovided-for case resolves itself, then,
59. Codex 1.14.12 translated and discussed in ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 112-13
(1927).
60. Samuel, Codification of Lawe, 5 UNIV. OF TORONTO L. REV. 148, 151 (1953).
61. BENTHAM, op. cit. supra note 30, at 155.
62. See, e.g., JOLOWIcz, ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW 11-15 (1957), where it is
noted that one of the most formidable obstacles to literal acceptance of Justinian's prohibi-
tion was the inclusion in the Corpus Juris itself of many passages from classical jurists
advocating and applying much more liberal canons of construction.
63. "The Judge who refuses to decide, on the pretext of the silence, obscurity or Insuf-
ficiency of the law, may be prosecuted as guilty of a denial of justice." Code CtiZ art. 4.
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into a heirarchy of secondary sources. In the codes m operation at
the time of Field's work, attempts to provide expressly for such
a heirarchy varied considerably in scope. It appears that the Prus-
sian code (1794) did in fact attempt to prohibit interpretation, and
required that doubtful cases be referred to a commission which
legislates for that particular case; but despite the prohibition
against making decisions on the basis of judicial precedent, Austin
insists that they had substantial persuasive authority s, Somewhat
more sensibly, the French code contented itself simply with pro-
hibiting in article 5 the deciding of cases on the basis of overt
precedent, without attempting to prescribe the sources of authority
which could be utilized in cases where the law was silent, obscure
or insufficient.6 5 The Austrian code (1811) added to the prohibition
against overt precedents a list of priorities, namely analogy from
provisions of the code, and (failing such analogies) the principles of
natural law 66 The Louisiana code (1825) provided in article 21.
In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the
judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity
To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural
law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is
silent.
This provision is the only one which recognized pre-existing custom
as an appropriate secondary source, and that only as a permissible
alternative without special priority; it has since been held, however,
that since judicial decisions are evidence of "received usages"
within the meaning of Article. 21, stare decisis applies in Louisiana.
67
Field, however, was working under somewhat different condi-
tions than the civilian codifiers, primarily in that he was codifying
an existing system which had consisted primarily of customary
law, but which had also developed an elaborate set of rules for
interpreting the relatively few statutes which presumed to impinge
on its domain. Accordingly, the New York code provides more
elaborately than its continental counterparts for the unprovided-for
case, and the keynote is preservation of prior law It starts with a
recognition of case-law or common law as one of the three ways
in which the law-giver ("the State") expresses his will (sec. 3 (3),
sec. 5)-the others being the Constitution and statutes-and then
64. This feature of the Prussian system is discussed in II AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 668
(Campbell 5th ed. 1885).
65. "Judges are prohibited from deciding cases before them by way of general or rule-
making opinions." supra note 63, art. 5.
66. Art. 7, discussed in Samuel, sup7io note 60, at 152.
67. Keller v. Haas, 209 La. 343, 24 So.2d 610 (1946). This problem is discussed in con-
nection with the recent Dutch code revision in Dainow, Code Revtsion in the Netherlands-
General Problems, 17 LA. L. 1REV. 273 (1956).
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provides, somewhat clumsily, that "there is no common law, in
any case, where the law is declared by the five Codes" (sec. 6),
that the rule of strict construction of statutes derogating from the
common law is inapplicable to the code (sec. 2032), and that the Code
repeals statutes, laws, etc., which are inconsistent with it (sec. 2033)
What is contemplated, then, is that the first inquiry be into possible
analogies from other provisions of the code, but that the prior law
be the next alternative. Field explains his ideas in the introduction
to the completed code:
Therefore, if there be an existing rule of law omitted from
this code, and not inconsistent with it, that rule will continue
to exist in the same form in which it now exists . and
if new cases arise, as they will, which have not been foreseen,
they may be decided, if decided at all, precisely as they
would now be decided, that is to say, by analogy to some
rule in the Code, or to some rule omitted from the Code
and therefore still existing, or by the dictates of natural
justice.68
Thus Field clearly did not contemplate the abandonment of
precedent as a source of authority where the code is found to be
silent. Another way in which a code can leave room for a creative
function in the courts is by the formulation of particular provisions
so as to give the judge discretion in certain types of cases. In
general, Field's code does not abound in such provisions; the style
of draftsmanship is dogmatic and precise and tends, rather more
than Field's own statements would suggest, to be dominated by rules
rather than principles.6 9 However, a number of such provisions can
be found, a few of which follow, with the key individualizing phrases
emphasized:
Sec. 12: A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deem-
ed an existing person, so far as may be necessary for its
interests in the event of its subsequent birth.
Sec. 69: A judgment for separation, whether for life, or for
a limited period, may be at any time revoked, under such
regulations as the court may impose, upon the joint applica-
tion of the parties, with satisfactory evidence of their recon-
ciliation.
Sec. 92: The (trial-level) court may direct an allowance
to be made to the parent of a child, out of its property,
68. N.Y. Crv. Coos at xix (1865).
69. The most effective critic of the code in action, John Norton Pomeroy in California,
objected particularly to the abandonment of established terminology, which he found was
not accompanied by a shift to a non-technical style but amounted simply to a revision
of technicalities. Pomeroy, The True Method of Interpreting the Civil Code, 3 WEST COAST
R rTR. 585, 586, 657 (1884).
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for its past or future support and education, on such condi-
tions as may be proper, whenever such direction is for his
benefit.
Sec. 1905: On adjudging the rescission of a contract, for
any other cause than usury, the court may require the party
to whom such relief is granted to make any compensation
to the other which justice may require.
This style of drafting as a technique for freeing the courts from the
inconveniences of abstract rules is not talked about in any of the
literature on codification in Field's time. It is to be assumed therefore
that such provisions in a substantive code result not so much from
a design on the draftsman's part as from the fact that existing
formulations were in those terms. Other forms of indeterminacy
leaving scope for judicial creativity, such as deliberate vagueness or
non-technicality of terminology, are even less frequently found in
the Code.
70
A peculiarity of the Code, which seems to recognize some range
of freedom of interpretation in the courts, is the inclusion m Division
IV (General Provisions) of a part entitled "Maxims of Jurispru-
dence," secs. 1964-1998. The only precedent for this type of provision
in a code, to my knowledge, is the title in Justinian's Digest,
De diversis regulis juris antLqui (of various rules of ancient law) 71
Indeed Field cites several of those 211 "rules" in his notes, as
ultimate sources for his own. However, such maxims were woven
into the fabric of English law; Coke and Blackstone bristle with
them, and so has every treatise on Equity down to the present
day 72 While many of the maxims of English law were derived
from the Digest, others were developed indigenously; their function
may be not simply to state a broad principle of law, as did most of
the maxims of Equity, but also to provide a rule of thumb for the
interpretation of a statute or of a private transaction.7 3 Field's 34
maxims are only a more or less judicious selection of those which
had a general application, leaving those having special application
to the appropriate special section of the Code. Some of the Equity
70. Rather more thought is given to these considerations today, and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code demonstrates acute awareness of them. See, e.g., part IV of Gilmore, On the
Difficulties of Codifyfng Commercial Law, 57 YALE L. J. 1341 (1948).
71. D. 50.17. For an extremely interesting study of this title and its role in the history
of legal ideas, see STEIN, IEGUwT Juals (1966).
72. One of the three full-scale treatises, devoted entirely to maxims, cited by Field in
his notes to the completed draft, BROOM, A SELECTION OF LoAL MAXIMS, was first pub-
lished in 1845 and was In its fourth edition by 1864, the ninth edition was published in
1924 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1924). For Equity, e.g., POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE,
§ 363 (4th ed., 1918).
73. A long passage on maxims and their historical function is to be found in 3 POUND,
JURxsPRUDENCH 513-57 (1959).
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maxims, for example, are incorporated into the section on specific
relief. The Code attempts an explanation of their purpose:
Sec. 1964: The maxims of jurisprudence hereinafter set
forth are intended not to qualify any of the foregoing pro-
visions of this Code, but to aid in their just application.
Field probably conceived of them as serving something like an
educational purpose, as well as providing the courts with some
handy tools of interpretation. It seems unlikely that even he sup-
posed maxims not included to be repealed by implication.
Even the Latin counterparts of many of the maxims are familiar
today- ubL ]us, ibi remedium (for every wrong, there is a remedy) ,7
de m inLms non curat lex (the law disregards trifles), 75 cessante
ratzone legis cessat ipsa lex (when the reason of a rule ceases, so
should the rule itself) ,76 volent non fit injurza (he who consents to
an act is not wronged by it) , 77 fortunately, some appear to have no
Latin counterparts, such as "That which ought to have been done,
is to be regarded as done, in favor of him to whom, and against
him from whom, performance is due" 7 --a maxim of Equity from
which, among other things, the doctrine of equitable conversion
was derived. All of the maxims included in the Code are found in
the Anglo-American literature of the period. They survive in the
present North Dakota Century Code.
79
CLASSIFICATION, TERMINOLOGY, SOURCES
It has been said that the influence of the civil law on the New
York Code is especially apparent in the classification of various
portions of the private law 80 There is some truth to this, although
not much light, since the various civilian systems differ from each
other in this respect as much as from any of the common law sys-
tems and writers. Some peculiarities of the Code, however, are
of interest.
Obligations. The New York Code consists of four Divisions:
Persons, Property, Obligations, and General Provisions applicable
in at least two of the first three divisions. The first notable peculiarity
of classification, then, is the devotion of a separate division to the
law of obligations-which included both contracts and torts, the
74. N.Y. CIV. CODE § 1978 (1865).
75. N.Y. Crv. CODE § 1988 (1865).
76. N.Y. CIv. CODE § 1965 ,(1865).
77. N.Y. Civ. CODE § 1970 (1865).
78. N.Y. CIV. CODE § 1984 (1865).
79. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-05 (1960).
80. Harrison, The First Half-Century of the California Civil Code, 10 CALIF. L. REv.
185, 193 (1922).
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latter under the rubric "obligations imposed by law " Certainly
there was no precedent for this m the common law Blackstone
deals with contracts in his Book II on Property, as modes of ac-
quiring rights,8' and with torts in his Book III' on Private Wrongs; 
8 2
Kent deals with contracts in his section on Personal Property83
and with torts (very briefly) in his Rights of Persons.84 On the
other hand, neither the Corpus Juris Civilis nor the Napoleonic code
treats obligations as a wholly separate classification; the former
classed obligations as incorporeal things, res incorporales,85 while
the latter classed them as modes of acquiring property 86 However,
both of the latter systems refer to contracts and torts generically
as obligations, and Pothier, whose works Field cites from time to
time in the notes to his completed draft, worte a separate treatise
on the law of obligations which was almost the sole source for
the provisions m this field of the Napoleonic code. 17 Field's expla-
nation for this and other peculiarities of classification, in his intro-
duction, is terse but suggestive:
It will be observed that there has been some departure from
the ordinary arrangement, resulting principally from the de-
sire of the Commissioners to confine each title to a single
branch of a general subject, and not to permit the repetition
of a principle once stated. In the first part of the third
division, that which treats of obligations in general, many
provisions are placed, particularly m respect to the extinction
of obligations, which have generally been referred to contracts
alone.88
The matter of classification, of course, is not all that simple,
for it is possible to arrive at quite different results, ostensibly in
the interest of conceptual economy, depending on one's starting
point. Perhaps it should be said, in defense of Field's seeming
nonchalance, that the bulk of the serious thinking about how to
arrange a systematic statement of the law had yet to be done in
the Anglo-American systems by the time he did his work on the
Civil Code, and that there is still much to be done. For present
purposes it will suffice to refer to an article published m 1870 by
Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr., in which he expresses the belief that
81. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
82. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *ch. V11L
83. 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 0449 (1896).
84. Id. at 15.
85. See JoLowIcZ, ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW 73 (1957).
86. Supra note 63, art. 711 "Property in things Is acquired and transmitted by suc-
cession, by gifts inter tnvos or testamentary, and by the effect of obligations."
87. See for an outline of the treatise Montmorency, Robert Joseph Pothier and French
Law, GREAT JURISTS OF THE WORLD 742-5 (1914), See also as to the statement in the text
AMOS & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 31 (2d ed. 1963).
88. N.Y. CIv. CODE at xxxi-xxxii.
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"the most considerable advantage which might be reaped from a
code" would be the achievement of "a philosophically arranged
corpus juris," and that a code "would treat (a) subject once and in
the right place."' 9 He then suggests that the basic conception for
classification purposes should be duty rather than right; and he
concludes that torts are a distinct class of inter-personal duties
("duties of all the world to all the world") from contracts, property,
agency, etc. ("duties of all the world to persons in certain particular
positions or relations") 90
Bailments. Another peculiarity of arrangement acknowledged
by Field in the introduction to the Code is the handling of bailments,
which is "not treated by itself, but under different titles, as deposit,
loan, hiring, service, carriage, trust, agency, and pledge." 9' Here
Field undoubtedly reflects the influence of civilian notions, but the
reasons for this appear to be more accidental than arbitrary In
Field's time the Anglo-American law of bailments was only begin-
ning to develop, and was still dominated by categories taken directly
from the civil law Kent 92 lists five species, each with a Latin
name: depositum, mandatum, commodatum, pignus,93 and locatio;
Story94 supplies the English equivalents as deposit, mandate, loan
for use, pledge or pawn, and hiring, respectively Blackstone defined
bailment (the word coming from the French bailler, to deliver) as
"a delivery of goods in trust, upon a contract expressed or implied,
that the trust shall be faithfully executed on the part of the bailee.
' ' 95
Kent added the characteristic that the goods were to be returned, 96
but Story pointed out that this is not true of a bailment for sale,
such as a consignment, 97 and offered the following definition:
(A) bailment is a delivery of a thing in trust for some
special object or purpose, and upon a contract, express or
implied, to conform to the object or purpose of the trust.9"
The difficulty of classification, obviously, is that bailment com-
bines elements of contract with elements of property Having once
decided to divide property and contract (obligations) into two co-
ordinate branches of private law, the difficulty becomes acute. None
89. Holmes, Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REv. 1-3 (1870), re-
printed in 44 HA~v. L. J. 725 (1931).
90. Id. at 3, 6, 7. Holmes was then editing the 12th edition of Kent's Commentaries,
which ostensibly proceed from the basis of right.
91. N.Y. Crv. CODE at xxxii.
92. 2 KENT, op. cit. supra note 83, at $558-59.
93. Only this is rendered in English by Kent, as pledge, for no obvious reason.
94. STORY, op. cit. supra note 49, at 9, 10.
95. 2 BLACKSIONE, COMMENTARIES *451.
96. 2 KENT, op. cit. supra note 83, at 0558.
97. STORY, op. cit. supra note 49, at 2.
98. Id. at 4.
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of the precedents are entirely helpful. The Corpus juris ctvilis of
Justinian classifies each of the relevant transactions as contract,
which is a subheading of obligation which is in turn a subheading
of the law of things. 99 Perhaps the most significant classification
of contract in the Roman law is that of real, verbal, litteral and
consensual, according chiefly to the manner in which the obligation
is established. 100 Of the contracts classed in English law as bail-
ments, only three are classed in Roman law as real, that is, created
by the transfer of thing: commodatum, depositum, and pignus; 1 1
mandatum and locatto, on the other hand, are classed as consensual,
that is, created by the agreement of the parties by itself. 10 2 For
the Romans, then, the fact that a conract involved the transfer
of possession of a thing was not a unifying factor, but rather whether
the obligation itself arose upon delivery of the thing or simply
upon the agreement of the parties. Blackstone lists bailment as a
type of contract, without breaking it down into categories; but
contract is a subheading of the law of things, so that the combination
of property and contract aspects does not pose a problem of classifi-
cation. Similarly, with the Napoleonic code, the various types
of contract classed in our law as bailments are listed separately,
but obligations are classed as modes of acquiring property, so
that although Pothier probably included them in his separate treatise
on obligations, the code civil itself is not a helpful precedent. Only
Kent lists bailments separately in a classification coordinate with
contracts generally, but each is a subheading under Personal
Property
Although Story was already toying with the classification of
bailments according to whether they are for the benefit of the bailor,
the bailee, or both, 03 he did not shake the civilian typology, and
it was not until much later that the tripartite classification became
the dominant one.1 0 4 This shift in classification, which serves chiefly
the purpose of defining the extent to which the bailee is responsible
for damage or loss of the thing bailed, emphasizes the property
aspect of bailments, but the subject is quite confused even today
by the variety of contractual arrangements which can surround
the possession of a thing owned by someone else.1 0 5 Indeed, once
99. JOLOWICZ, op. cit. supra note 85.
100. See LE, ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 285 (4th ed. 1956).
101. Id. at 290.
102. Id. at 307.
103. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 5-6 (3rd ed. 1843).
104. See generally BROWN, LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 80 (2d ed. 1955).
105. BROWN, Id. devotes 60 pages, out of his 250 on baiiments, to distinguishing them
from "other similar transactions" (ch. X), and another 106 to "some special types of ball-
ments"-namely involuntary bailments, carriage, and Innkeepers (ch. XII). Holmes also
thought "bailment" to be a category not worth keeping; HOLMES, OP. cit. supra note 89, at
11.
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the common identifying characteristic of bailments is defined as
"possession of goods [by one person], which belong to another,' ' 30 6
it is not difficult to see why Field chose not to use it as a classification
at all, since the contractual aspects are the crucial ones, and since
some bailments, such as mandate, share these contractual aspects
with other transactions which are clearly not bailments. This peculi-
arity, then, is dictated largely by conceptual economy, and vindi-
cated by the unsatisfactory results of the usual alternative.
Agency A point of classification for which the code was later
mildly criticized as departing from "principles of the English
common law' '10 7 was the inclusion of agency under the heading of
Obligations rather than of Persons. Field notes in the introduction
that "matters usually treated under the title of principal and agent,
are here treated under service, trust and agency "I08 To the extent
that principles of English common law can be found, they are not
altogether clear on this point. Blackstone, to be sure, dealt with
agency under the general heading of master and servant, which
appears in Book I on the Rights of Persons. 10 9 However, Kent
makes the law of principal and agent a subheading of the law of
personal property, coordinate with contracts and bailments, among
others, while master and servant remains a subheading of the Law
of Persons. The connection with the law of persons seems to result
from looking at the relationship first internally, then only secondarily
from the point of view of the outsider dealing with the agent.
Master/servant to Blackstone was a basic personal relationship,
coordinate with husband/wife, parent/child and guardian/ward; 110
the prototype of the master/servant relationship is the institution
of slavery, which was outlawed as such by English law but which
is difficult to distinguish for this purpose from "perpetual service,"
which was still recognized:
[I]t is laid down, that a slave ., the instant he lands in
England, becomes a freeman; that is, the law will protect
him in the enjoyment of his person, and his property Yet,
with regard to any right which the master may have lawfully
acquired to the perpetual service of John or Thomas, this
will remain exactly in the same state as before; for this is
no more than the same state of subjection for life, which
every apprentice submits to for the space of seven years, or
sometimes for a longer term.""'
106. BROWN, Op. cit. supra note 104, at 254.
107. Harrison, The First Half-Century of the California Civil Code, 10 CALIF. L. RlEv.
185, 193 (1922).
108. N.Y. Crv. CODE at xXxii.
109. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *428.
110. Id. at 422.
111. Id. at 424-425.
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This point of view is rather similar to that of the Roman law, where
in fact the principal/agent relationship was limited to the family
in the broad sense, that is, to wife, children, slaves, with very
limited exceptions, and never reached the point of allowing the
agent who was not a subordinate member of the family to act
solely as an intermediary without binding himself. 11 2 That Kent
split off principal/agent from the law of persons, and Field the
remainder of master/servant, is probably due less to an abandon-
ment of essential principles of English common law, than to the
industrial revolution and the emancipation of labor
Trusts. Another of the more troublesome points of organization
and terminology in the Code is found in the provisions on trusts.
The main title on trusts (secs. 1167-1215) is set forth in the Division
on Obligations in the part on "Obligations Arising from Particular
Transactions." It is pointed out in the introduction that the title on
trusts includes provisions governing all confidential relationships. An
explanation for this is essayed in the note to sec. 1168, defining
trusts in general:
A trust is defined by Story as an equitable title to property
But this is a very narrow definition. So far as his ob-
ligations are concerned, a technical trustee stands upon the
same footing with a confidential agent or adviser, a guardian,
etc., and there is little difference, so far as business relations
are concerned, between his position and that of a husband,
wife, parent, or attorney The confidence reposed is the es-
sence of this relation, and it will be found, by reference to
the numerous cases cited in the course of this Title, that
little or no distinction is made between trustees, strictly so
called, and any other persons who accept the personal con-
fidence of another
Dealing with the general subject of trusts under the general
heading of obligations involved a departure from the usual. Both
Blackstone 13 and Kent" 4 discuss trusts m connection with real
property, and both explain the history of trusts (as does Story" 5)
in terms of development from the early English "use" and the
Roman fideicommissum, which were originally methods of accom-
plishing beneficial transfers of land to persons or entities (such as
the church, in England, or peregrines, in Rome) not capable under
the strict law of receiving or inheriting it directly from the trans-
feror By Story's time, and probably even by Blackstone's, it was
112. See LEE, op. cit. supra note 100, at 360, 61, 63, 64.
113. 2 BI4A.CKSTONE, COMMENTARIES $327-29.
114. 4 KENT, CommENTARIEs ON AMERICAN LAW 0289-91 (1896).
116. 2 SToRY, CoMMExT,&Rrns ON EQurrY JuISPRUDENcE § 965 (Bigelow 13th ed. 1886).
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clear that trusts could be established in personalty as well as
realty, 1 6 but the association with property was still of the essence
of the trust; as will be discussed below, Field does not escape this
in the substance of his provisions, and he also devotes a title of
the part on Real Property to the ownership aspects of trusts. None-
theless, the obligational aspects of the modem trust are so pre-
dominant that it seems appropriate to deal with them primarily
under that head.
More difficult is the suggestion that trusts ought to be subsumed
under the general heading of confidential relations. If this is the
case, it seems clumsy to have used the term "trust" to designate
the larger class, when to Story and to the bar generally that term
had the very specific meaning of a separation of legal and bene-
ficial ownership. It is more likely, however, that Field's explana-
tion was ineptly put, and that what he was trying to do was rather to
subsume portions of the law of various confidential relations under
the heading of trust. Thus the relations of husband and wife,
guardian and ward, agency, and partnership are all dealt with in
separate titles, but each includes a cross-reference to the title on
trusts for certain obligations, chiefly those arising when a spouse,
guardian, agent or partner (fiduciary) deals in property or interests
properly belonging to or inuring to the benefit of the other spouse,
ward, principal or partner.117 Hence also the division of the title
on trusts into a chapter on "trusts in general" and a chapter on
"trusts for the benefit of third persons;" the former contain pro-
visions, applicable to all transactions designated as trusts, the
latter is specifically limited to the classic express trust in which
property is vested in a trustee for the benefit of someone other than
the transferor (trustor) (sec. 1191)
A third distinctive facet of the Code's handling of trusts is the
fundamental division of trusts into two classes, "voluntary" and
"involuntary " A later critic suggested that these were just idio-
syncratic words for the accepted division between "express" and
"implied" trusts,"1 8 and the 1943 North Dakota Code substituted
these terms for "voluntary" and "involuntary," respectively (59-
0101) This was clearly a misunderstanding of what Field had in
mind. In Story's treatise on Equity, which appears to have been
Field's main source in this area, "express trusts" are defined as
"those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the
116. Id. § 964.
117. N.Y. Civ. Code §§ 79 (husband/wife), 131 (guardian/ward), 1240 (3) (agent/prin-
cipal), and 1292 (partnership) (1865).
118. Pomeroy, The True Method of Interpreting the Californ4a Citht Code, 3 WEST COAST
REPra. 691, 694 (1884).
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parties by some writing or deed", and "implied trusts are those
which are deducible from the nature of the transaction as a matter
of clear intention, although not found in the words of the parties,
or which are superinduced upon the transaction by operation of law
as a matter of equity, independent of the particular intention of
the parties."'1 9 The former class of implied trusts are also called
"resulting," and the latter "constructive," Field's definitions of
"voluntary" and "involuntary" make it clear that the former in-
cludes both express trusts and resulting trusts, while the latter in-
cludes only constructive trusts.
A voluntary trust is an obligation arising out of a personal
confidence reposed in, and voluntarily accepted by one, for
the benefit of another (sec. 1169)
An involuntary trust is one which is created by operation
of law (sec. 1169)
This is further reinforced by the obviously deliberate use of the
term "express trusts" in the definition of the special class of
"trusts for the benefit of third persons" (sec. 1191)
The provisions in both chapters of the title on trusts are in-
stinct with the standard notion of trusts as involving the handling
by a trustee of property or business affairs for the benefit of an-
other Although the parties to a trust-the trustor, trustee and
beneficiary-are expressly defined in sec. 1170, the notion of "the
trust property" is dropped into sec. 1178 without any definition, as
if it were self-evident that a trust involved property in some sense:
A trustee may not use or deal with the trust property for
his own profit, or for any other purpose unconnected with
the trust, in any manner
This in the section on trusts in general, when the definitions thereof
(secs. 1168, 1169 quoted above) omit any reference to property
The property aspects of trusts, strictly so called, are dealt with
in the title "Uses and Trusts" (secs. 274-299) in the Real Property
part of the Division on Property There are no corresponding pro-
visions in the part on Personal Property, perhaps because it was
felt that the doctrine of estates was so realty-oriented as to demand
treatment in that area although in theory also applicable to per-
sonalty; in any case, as we have noted, Blackstone and Kent both
placed uses and trusts in this category This must be regarded
as an unfortunate oversight, especially in the law of trusts where
119. 2 STORY, op. at. supra note 115 § 980.
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realty and personalty are often if not inevitably mixed. The title
reflects the traditional execution of passive uses as under the Eng-
lish Statute of Uses, to vest the estate m the cestui que use, with
the subsequent exception of the active use or trust from the opera-
tion of the Statutue, but with two refinements of note. First, the
theory of an equitable estate m the beneficiary is dropped by sec.
291.
Except as hereinafter otherwise provided, every express
trust in real property, valid as such, m its creation, vests
the whole estate m the trustees, subject only to the execution
of the trust. The beneficiaries take no estate or interest m
the property, but may enforce the performance of the trust.
Second , and more importantly, a short exclusive list of permissible
purposes for express trusts is attempted in sec. 285, leaving little
room for development except through the medium of "powers in
trust." Sec. 288 provides:
Where an express trust in relation to real property is
created for any purpose not enumerated m the preceding
sections, such trust vests no estate in the trustees; but the
trust, if directing or authorizing the performance of any act
which may be lawfully performed under a power, is valid
as a power m trust, subject to the provisions in relation to
such powers, contained in Title V of this Part.
The permissible purposes are four in number: (1) to sell realty
for the benefit of creditors; (2) to sell, mortgage or lease realty for
the benefit of legatees, or to satisfy a charge on the property (this
could be stretched to cover most testamentary trusts), (3) to collect
rents and profits for the benefit of another, but only for the latter's
lifetime; and (4) to accumulate the rents and profits.
The bulk of this title is taken from the New York Revised Statutes
of 1828, including the provisions mentioned above, and were there-
fore not inventions of Field. They were enacted in time to be
criticized by Kent in his Commentartes as inept, because the net
effect, if not to restrict the scope of the institution, was to change
established terminology, without a corresponding benefit.
120
Mortgages. In the Code, the law of mortgages, pledges, mari-
time mortgages, and various liens are gathered together under the
single title, "Lien," in the part on "Obligations Arising From Par-
ticular Transactions." The introduction contains the following re-
mark on the subject:
120. 4 KzN, osp. cit. aupra note 114. at 308-13.
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Mortgage, equally with pledge, is treated under the lien,
an effort having been made to clear the law of mortgage
from the confusions and contradictions which have been pro-
duced by the counter action of law and equity for so many
years.
12 1
At that time the standard terminology apparently distinguished be-
tween common law liens, which depended upon possession by the
creditor, and equitable liens, which were independent of possession
in the creditor; the term "Lien" by itself was understood to refer
only to common law liens.122 What Field sought to do m the title
on lien was to establish transfer of possession or retention thereof
as the central distinction between types of lien, and to use the term
"mortgage" to designate those established without the necessity of
transfer of possession, with "pledge" designating liens established
by transfer of possession to the creditor Here he expressly drew
on the civil law concepts of mortgage and pledge, although the
heart of the difference appears to have been terminological, in that
the effective range of choice among security devices does not seem
to have been much enlarged or diminished. One aspect of the
modern civil law of mortgage which was not adopted by Field, for
example, was the restriction of the device to real or Immovable
property; 1 23 the chattel mortgage was well established in American
law and was retained. 124 He apparently saw the chief difference be-
tween security interests accompanied by possession and those not
so accompanied, in the necessity for publicity A mortgage had to
be in writing and recorded, 125 whereas a pledge did not, because
in the latter case the possession of the creditor and the requirement
of public sale afforded the requisite publicity toward third persons.
A change was made in one respect, however, in that a chattel mort-
gage accompanied by a transfer of possession was deemed in the
Code to be a pledge, under sec. 1648. The effect of this would seem
primarily to cause the creditor to lose his lien if he lets go of the
property, pursuant to sec. 1607, unless he gets a specific agree-
ment to the contrary; it is hard to see why this was necessary,
if a given transaction complies with the writing and recording re-
121. N.Y. Civ. CoD at xxxiL
122. See commissioners' note to § 1582.
123. See NAPOLEONIC CODn art. 2118. The Roman law appears not to have made any such
distinction, although the original use of hypotheca was to give a landlord a lien for rent
on the possessions of the tenant; See LEE, oP. cit. auprdnote 100, at 176-77.
124. E.g., KENT, op. cit. supra note 83, at *516-632. Here it is noted, nonetheless, that
many jurisdictions adopt the view (which Kent approves) that a chattel mortgage without
a transfer of possession is void as against creditors of the mortgagor. To this extent, then,
by making chattel mortgages without delivery of possession valid (if written and recorded)
and chattel mortgages with delivery of possession into pledges, Field changed the law of
New York.
125. Mortgages of realty, sec. 1623, of personalty, sec. 1634.
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quirements of chattel mortgages, particularly if the two sections
are open to the construction that a writing and recordation of a
chattel mortgage agreement constitutes the agreement necessary to
preserve the lien under 1607 after relinquishment of possession.
Other Civilian Influences. We have already discussed most of
the major areas in which the New York Code consciously draws on
French, Roman or other civil law sources. All told, such sources
are cited in the commissioners' notes to over 75 out of the 2031
sections of the Code; in most instances the civilian source is ac-
companied by New York or other common law authorities, but on
the other hand much of the law of bailment is cited to Story, which
in turn drew on civilian sources, and thereare a few other instances
of this sort. Perhaps the biggest single direct draft on the civil
law is in the law of accession; six of the seven sections on accession
to real property are taken almost verbatim from the Napoleonic
Code, and eight of the nine on accession to personal property are
also practically lifted out of that code. However, it is not obvious
whether this constituted a drastic change in the substance of the
law, or merely adoption of a particularly apt formulation of rules
already accepted in the common law 126 Another area in which sub-
stantial reliance is placed on civilian sources is the powers and
duties of shipmasters, secs. 1050-60, as a "particular employment"
in the title on Service; most of these sections are drawn from the
French code de commerce, as are several others in the law of
Service and Carriage relating to maritime shipping.
In at least one instance, a civilian term is introduced into an
area where the Anglo-american law is thought to have peculiar rules,
thus raising at least the possibility of substantive effect. In the law
of contract, sec. 745 provides:
It is essential to the existence of a contract that there
should be:
1. Parties capable of contracting;
2. Their consent;
3. A lawful object; and,
4. A sufficient cause or consideration.
The problem is raised here, whether "cause" and "consideration"
are intended to be synonymous, and if they are, wherein the dif-
ference lies. "Consideration" is a common law term with which
every lawyer is now and was then familiar, however vague the
126. For a suggestion that the common law might have developed, but for the civil law
influence, the notion of occupancy as the basis for giving title to the owner of the land to
which the accretion attaches, rather than accession as such, see the article by Professor
Beck in this issue, at p. 436 n. 29.
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outer limits of it appear to be; "cause" is not a term with any such
meaning m the common law of contract. It was acknowledged by
Blackstone that our concept of consideration was taken from the
Roman law maxim, ex nudo pacto non oritur actio, (no action arises
from a bare agreement), and he draws heavily on civilian sources, as:
The civilians hold, that in all contracts, either express or
implied, there must be something given in exchange, some-
thing that is mutual or reciprocal. This thing, which is the
price or motive of the contract, we call the considera-
ation. 127
Kent also acknowledged this derivation; 128 but neither author refers
to the term "causa" or "cause." Since Field's provision is expressly
drawn from article 1108 of the Napoleonic code, at least some poss-
ibility exists that he intended the French "cause," which was rather
a broader notion of mutuality than our "consideration" and included
a reliably proven agreement as such, to be incorporated as an al-
ternative to "consideration;" this of course would have been at least
some change in existing law 129 The difficulty is not really over-
come by the provisions on "Consideration," in secs. 780-788. They
do not mention "cause," and they do not provide a true definition
of "consideration," but are rather in the non-exclusive form, "such-
and-such is a good consideration." It can only be supposed that it
was intended to render the two terms synonymous for purposes of
the code.
Similar possibilities for confusion might have been raised by the
Code's use of the phrases "real, or immovable property" and
"personal, or movable property" as headings for the parts on these
subjects in the Division of Property These pairs of terms, real/
personal from the common law, movable/immovable from the civil
law, were not equivalent as traditionally used. However, the defini-
tions of real/immovable property in secs. 163-166 and of personal
property in sec. 167, the latter as that which is not real, are suf-
ficiently clear to effectively foreclose the argument that they were
not intended to be made synonymous in the code.
Another instance in which adoption of a civilian formulation left
some room for potential confusion is found in the provision relating
to liability for negligence, sec. 853:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his
127. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444.
128. I Kent, op. cit. supra, 463-4. 2 Kent, op. cit. aupra note 88, at 0463-64.
129. See, e.g., von Mehren, The Code and Contract - A Comparative Analysis of Forma-
tion and Form, TnE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON LAw WORLD, 111-14 (Schwartz ed.
1956).
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willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by
his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his
property or person; except so far as the latter has, willfully,
or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself."
The first portion of this section was taken, according to Field's
notes, from the Napoleonic code, sec. 1383, and the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1825, sec. 2295, to both of which it is nearly identical; the
latter portion, referring to the problem of contributory negligence,
is said simply to be "modified somewhat from existing law." The
cases cited by Field for the existing law on the latter point ex-
pound the more or less traditional common law concept that con-
tributory negligence defeats recovery altogether, with the embellish-
ments of last clear chance, etc., the phrase "except in so far as,"
in the Code provisions, suggests apportionment of fault, or limiting
the effect of contributory negligence to proportionate mitigation of
damages. Neither the Louisiana code nor the Napoleonic say any-
thing about contributory negligence; however, by 1841 Louisiana had
opted by judicial decision for the common law rule,3 0 while the rule
of mitigation appears to have been the accepted one in France.13 1
The most reasonable conclusion to be drawn from Field's rather
vague comments seems to be that he preferred the French approach.
SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES
In addition to the instances already mentioned, the New York
Code contained a large number of provisions which the commis-
sioners acknowledged as changing the law in particular details. No
less than 120 sections are listed in the introduction as containing
at least a minor change in the existing law of New York. Most of
these were made simply because the commissioners thought the
existing rule not the best, while some, as we have seen, were also
made because a civilian precedent was available which was more
acceptable. There is not space in the present article to discuss these
changes in detail, and it must suffice to mention those major changes
which are mentioned in the final report to which the draft code
is appended. In the first place, the entire title on Adoption is said
to be new, because the existing New York law did not make any
provision at all for legal adoption; by sec. 116, in addition, it was
made possible for an illegitimate child to be adopted by his natural
father by acknowledgement, in which respect New York appears to
have been rather behind the rest of the country Further, the title
on Husband and Wife is said to be intended to remove many of the
130. Fleytas v. Ponchartrain Rail Road Co., 18 La. 339 (1841).
181. See 2 PLAINOL, TRAm EL5MUNTAma3 DE DRorr CivrL, § 889 (11th ed. 1939, transl. by
Louisiana State Law Institute, 1959).
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remaining disabilities of a wife, especially the capacity to contract
and to own and deal with her separate property, sec. 79. Thirdly,
the distinctions between real and personal property were eliminated
in two repects, namely, in that pursuant to sec. 638 both realty
and personalty pass first to a decedent's personal representatives
for administration and distribution, and that in general it was sought
to reduce the law of real property (presumably the forms of owner-
ship) to "the simplicity of personal." In this latter respect, it may
be doubted that the simplification was very extensive, since the
doctrine of estates is reproduced in the part on real property, in
many if not all of its tortured convolutions.
CONCLUSION
In discussing the outstanding features of the New York Code,
I have concentrated on those aspects which would almost certainly
have struck the eye of an American common-lawyer, seeking to
evaluate the code as piece of proposed legislation, as strange or
foreign or just confusing. Some of these strangenesses must be re-
garded as defects, in that they introduced potential confusion un-
necessarily, without any apparent benefit in terms of other purposes
of codification; the use of terms like "cause," "immovable" and
"movable" property, and the vagueness of the provision on contribu-
tory negligence, certainly fall into this category, unless Field had
in mind inducing the adoption of his code in civil law jurisdictions
like Louisiana. Other innovations, such as the handling of bailments,
mortgages, and some aspects of the law of trusts, were quite justi-
fiable in terms of conceptual economy and of intelligibility to the
layman; acceptance, understanding, and working out the conse-
quences of such refinements could be expected to result in real gains
for the legal system. Still others may have been unavoidable in
the attempt to systematize the common law and rescue it from the
narrowness and repetitions of separate partial courses and trea-
tises. On the whole, it must be said that the code, despite many
imperfections, went a long way toward rationalization of American
law-it should have served as a good rough draft, ready for
thorough examination and revision by experts in the various fields,
public exposition, and so on.
The fact that it did not receive this treatment anywhere, and
that these foreign influences became collectively a rallying ground
for more or less successful attacks on the code, should serve at
least to illustrate the relative ineffectiveness of one of the argu-
ments for codification, namely that a code should be useful and
intelligible to the layman. Certainly lawyers rather than laymen
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were its effective opponents, not only where it was rejected but also
where it was adopted. How it was opposed, how defended, and how
applied, is the next part of the story
